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1. Bringing mechanics to the form of Art 
 
Simon Stevin is a seminal author in the so-called ‘renaissance of mathematics’.1 His vernacular 
books on statics and hydrostatics (published together in 1586) not only helped readers to become 
familiar with Archimedean mechanics, but they also contained strikingly innovative additions, such 
as his proof of the law of the inclined plane and the hydrostatic paradox. They also stand out for 
their self-confident character: Stevin was well aware of the novelty of his approach, and he claimed 
in the introduction to his text that he was the first author to allow statics, which he called the ‘art 
of weighing’ (weeghconst), to ‘come to the form of Art’.2 
The idea that a field of practical operations could be subject to what was usually called 
‘reduction to art’ was very common in the period.3 It was an idea with ancient Ciceronian 
precedents that had become imbued with the Renaissance notion of method. The ideal was to 
provide a systematic, textual presentation that would bring as many actions as possible under the 
purview of a small number of principles that allowed one quickly and efficiently to decide on how 
to proceed to attain one's goals. Stevin's books from 1586 did not provide many explicit statements 
on how he understood this ideal, but we can read his discussion on the ‘restoration of the Age of 
the Sages’, included in his Wisconstighe Ghedachtenissen (published in 1605-1608), as an articulation of 
the method behind his attempted ‘reduction to the form of art’.  
Stevin introduced five components that characterize the order to be followed in the written 
presentation of any art.4 One should start the presentation by laying out the definitions of all the 
constwoorden (terms of art). One should then strive always to express similar things with similar 
words throughout the text (using what is known in rhetoric as anaphora), so that their relation is 
immediately clear. Each proposition in the treatise should be presented according to the model 
provided by Euclid's Elements, clearly separating the different parts, such as the givens, proof and 
conclusion. This not only transparently exhibits the deductive structure responsible for the 
proposition's truth, but it should also allow each reader immediately to identify the part he is 
interested in on different occasions. Using properly constructed dichotomous divisions (visually 
presented at the opening of a text in the typical tables using curly brackets) allows one immediately 
to see that the text as a whole offers a complete treatment of its subject, without leaving out any 
parts, and that its parts will be presented in the right order, where later parts presuppose earlier 
parts but not the other way around. Interestingly, these tables will also help rationalize the inverse 
translation back into practice, by functioning as a kind of decision tree that allows all the relevant 
options to be seen at a glance.5 And lastly, one should present the theoretical treatment separately 
from the practical applications that form its ultimate goal, so that the specifically systematic 
character of the former can be grasped by the reader. As stressed by Stevin, this will again aid the 




particular purpose at hand, without having first to separate it from any other, extraneous practical 
operations that have been included unnecessarily in the presentation. 
In what follows, I will offer an analysis of how Stevin's books on The Principles of the Art of 
Weighing (Weeghconst) and The Practice of Weighing (Weeghdaet) can be seen as exemplifying this typical 
Renaissance ideal of reduction to art.6 There was yet another prominent discourse concerning the 
arts, though, and I will also try to see how this relates to Stevin's endeavor. According to the 
Aristotelian conception, the arts are characterized by two features: that they aim at useful ends, and 
that they do so by investigating the causes of things (see, e. g., the first chapter of the first book of 
the Metaphysics). Any reflection on the notion of causality is conspicuously missing from Stevin's 
characterization of the proper order to be used in the arts, but this did not stop him from using 
causal terminology throughout his texts. Thus, how is his use of causal language related to the ideal 
of a reduction to art? As we will see, Stevin's text on dialectics, or what he calls Bewysconst (‘the art 
of demonstrating’), which he published a year before his books on statics, offers a number of 
important clues. This text also bears many hallmarks of the ideal of reduction to art, but it has the 
added interest that because of the traditional nature of its subject matter, it also engages explicitly 
with the Aristotelian discourse.7  
 
 
2. Delineating a field 
 
When Stevin stressed the importance of first gathering definitions in his discussion of the 
‘restoration of the Age of the Sages’, he gave a seemingly trivial example: he explained how, when 
interacting with practitioners such as masons or carpenters, he would first ask them the meaning 
of the specific words they used in their practice, after which he would write these down and learn 
them by heart. Having learned them, he was then able to interact fluently with these practitioners.8 
This example seems trivial, because it suggests that defining is merely about learning the meaning 
of words.9 But when we approach the example from the perspective opened up by the ideal of a 
reduction to art, there is a more illuminating way to understand its importance. By introducing 
specific terms of art, these definitions drew attention to the relevant characteristics of the practical 
situation under consideration. By learning the meaning of these words, Stevin also learned to see 
which aspects of their practice were of special importance for these practitioners. Good definitions 
should thus in the first place communicate the relevant characteristics of the situation under 
consideration – where relevance is always relative to what one wants to be able to achieve. 
In his Bewysconst, Stevin had already explained that he translated definitio with the Dutch 
bepaling because this has the primary meaning of demarcating a piece of land by surrounding it with 
poles or palen.10 Accordingly, definitions must primarily succeed in properly delineating the field of 
study, and it does not matter how they achieve this. In this context, Stevin explicitly stated that he 
did not distinguish between definitions that are descriptive (by giving predicates that can be used 
to describe the subject corresponding to the term that is defined), explanatory (by merely indicating 
the meaning of words), or essential (by giving the essence of the subject). He justified this position 
with two revealing reasons: he appealed to the authority of mathematical authors such as 
Archimedes, and he strongly doubted the actual possibility of giving essential definitions privileged 
by philosophical authors such as Aristotle.11  
Let us now consider Stevin's The Principles of the Art of Weighing with this in mind. The 




weight, and the kind of configurations that will be addressed. The latter configurations single out 
geometrically significant relationships within the instruments used for weighing bodies, by 
‘explanatorily’ introducing specific terms for them, such as ‘beam’, ‘handle’ and ‘fixed point’. The 
most important properties of weight (which is ‘descriptively’ defined as the known value of a body's 
‘power of descent in a given place’12) have to do with the bodies' center of gravity, which Stevin 
‘descriptively’ defined as ‘the point such that if the body is conceived to be suspended from it, it 
remains at rest in any position given to it’.13 The subject matter of the book is defined as ‘the ratios, 
proportions, and properties of the weight or gravities of bodies’.14 
There is one further definition that merits comment, as it shows the crucial importance of 
Stevin's use of anaphora in his text. In definition XI, Stevin introduced the neologism evenstaltwichtigh 
to denote two gravities that keep each other in equilibrium. The need for a specific term is clear 
from the fact that two such gravities will in general not be of equal weight (and thus evenwichtigh – 
or equiponderant). Evenstaltwichtigh bodies only have the appearance of equal weight, but the real 
equality is one according to their position (‘na den ghestalt’).15 The requirements of textual 
presentation prompted Stevin to introduce this term, which was needed to avoid ambiguous 
expressions – but in the same move, it allows the reader to adopt a more abstract perspective on 
the situations described. The possibility of using the same term to describe a whole array of 
situations shows that there is a way in which they are all crucially similar. Bringing out the 
mathematical characterization of this similarity was the main goal of Stevin's treatise. Knowing the 
general conditions under which bodies are evenstaltwichtigh will allow any practitioner to reach his 
goals efficiently in all particular circumstances, once these are properly described, and will thus 
successfully reduce the field of operations involving heavy bodies to the form of art. As we will 
see, this knowledge is grounded in two fundamental propositions: the law of the lever and the law 
of the inclined plane. 
 
 
3. Demonstrating the law of the lever and the law of the inclined plane16 
 
The first proposition of The Principles of the Art of Weighing establishes the law of the lever. By 
assuming that equal bodies are in equilibrium when hanging from equal distances, Stevin was able 
to prove that if a heavier body is evenstaltwichtigh with a lighter one, the distances from which they 
are hanging have the inverse ratio of their weights.17 The proof is based on the similarity of both 
situations which can be almost directly visually ascertained in Stevin's first diagram (see fig. 1). The 
whole body ABCD is in equilibrium when suspended from its center T (which can be considered 
its center of gravity), since we can imagine it to be two equal bodies hanging from equal distances 
– and everyone agrees that these will be in equilibrium. If we now mentally divide the body into 
two unequal bodies rather than two equal bodies, they will also be in equilibrium, as long as they 
are suspended from the same point. For example, we can take the heavier body to be LMDA and 
the lighter LMCB, which have their own respective centers of gravity located in S and X (since 
these points divide the bodies again into equal parts). It is now easy to see that the distances of the 
centers of gravity of these supposedly evenstaltwichtigh bodies to their point of suspension T are 
inversely proportional to the weights of the bodies (as represented by their magnitudes).  
The validity of the demonstration rests on two related, crucial steps: the assumption that 
the unequal bodies will indeed remain in equilibrium when we actually hang them from their 




matter (such that the inverse proportionality established can be interpreted as proving the stated 
proposition in full generality, as shown in fig. 2, where Stevin replaced the regular bodies LMDA 
and LMCB with irregular bodies of the same weight). What is of interest here are the judgements 
of similarity that lie at the basis of both steps: that the situation with the irregular unequal bodies 
is similar to the one with the regular unequal bodies, which in turn is crucially similar to the one 
with the solid body hanging from its middle, so that the initial equilibrium will not be disturbed 
under these imaginary replacements. Crucially, these similarities can only be noticed once one has 
identified a body's center of gravity as being of special interest. Its definition draws attention to the 
existence of a uniquely privileged point within all bodies: if we want to neutralize the effect of a 
body's gravity, we have to suspend the body either from its center of gravity, or from somewhere 
in the vertical going through it (this is implicitly assumed throughout Stevin's treatment, and made 
explicit in a comment on proposition 6, where it was called a ‘common rule in the Art of 
Weighing’18); and if we suspend it from somewhere else, the body's non-balanced gravity will cause 
a motion that will stop when the body has reached its preferred position as determined by the 
center of gravity (this is further elaborated upon in propositions 6, 7 and 8 of Stevin's treatise). In 
other words: the center of gravity is the unique point at which we can imagine all of the body's 
weight to be concentrated – and it is the latter idea that underwrites both steps of the 
demonstration.  
The demonstration of the law of the lever can be usefully understood along the following 
lines.19 It is assumed (1) that all bodies possess a unique center of gravity (in which, for the reasons 
stated, their weight can be thought to be concentrated), and (2) that we can all agree that for 
symmetrical bodies this point is located in the geometrical center. The mathematical proof then 
shows how to determine the location of the center of gravity of composed bodies: it is the place 
from which the distances will be inversely proportional to the weights of the composing bodies. 
The proof thus brings us from an almost purely qualitative characterization of the center of gravity 
to a precise quantitative determination. 
In the appendix to the volume containing The Principles of the Art of Weighing, Stevin criticized 
an alternative demonstration of the law of the lever.20 Taking inspiration from the Aristotelian 
Mechanical Problems, some authors had claimed that the cause of unequal bodies being evenstaltwichtigh 
could be found in the circles they would describe under the conditions stated: the smaller body 
would describe a proportionally greater circle, and the greater body a proportionally smaller circle. 
Stevin merely pointed out that since bodies in equilibrium do not move, these postulated motions 
cannot be part of the cause of the equilibrium. Starting with Duhem, he has often been criticized 
for not having seen the potential fruitfulness of this approach, which can be supposed to have led 
to the principle of virtual velocities.21 For our purposes it is more interesting to point out that 
Stevin also emphatically stated that the true cause of evenstaltwicht was to be found ‘in that which 
has been proved about it mathematically’ in the demonstration of the law of the lever. Crucially, 
he added that these other authors' inability to devise the causes was related to the fact that they 
could not ‘reduce to the form of an Art of Weighing’ (sonder te crijghen form van Weeghconst) – thus 
explicitly relating the goal of reduction to art to knowledge of causes.  
The preceding analysis makes clear how, according to Stevin, the mathematical 
demonstration would have been able to uncover a cause. Two bodies are evenstaltwichtigh because 
their configuration is one that can be mathematically transformed into one where their common 
weight is distributed evenly around the point of suspension; and the possibility of such a 




mathematical law is nothing but the encoding of the similarity between these different 
configurations, and it is this similarity that provides the appropriate causal grounding. We will 
further analyze how this idea relates to the possibility of a successful reduction to art in the next 
two sections, but first we will consider the second foundational proposition underlying this 
reduction, the law of the inclined plane.  
The cause that grounds evenstaltwicht on an inclined plane can be understood along the same 
lines, although in this case the underlying similarity is easier to miss. Stevin famously demonstrated 
that when two connected bodies are lying on two inclined planes that form an upright prism, 
equilibrium will necessarily follow when their weights have the same proportion as the lengths of 
the planes. The demonstration consists in showing that if this were not the case, a perpetual motion 
would follow for a wreath lying around this prism consisting of connected equal spheres lying at 
equally spaced distances (since each postulated motion of the wreath would reproduce the original 
situation, with the number of spheres lying on each of the inclined planes determining the relevant 
weights stated in the condition; see fig. 3, which again allows one immediately to see that this is the 
case). Crucially, the perpetual motion that is excluded by Stevin is one that starts spontaneously, a 
fact all too often passed over in silence by commentators, but explicitly stated by Stevin. This is 
important, because we are dealing with heavy bodies, which by definition have an intrinsic tendency 
to descend; and as we saw, if their resulting motion is limited by the presence of fixed constraints, 
they also have a preferred position where they will come to rest, as determined by the relative 
position of their center of gravity and the constraints. The wreath of spheres lying around the prism 
can be considered a composite, heavy body: claiming that it could spontaneously start its motion 
by its weight, but that it would not reach a position of equilibrium, would amount to claiming that 
this body was completely dissimilar to bodies characterized by a center of gravity. It is the latter 
fact that Stevin judged to be absurd. It is thus again the underlying similarity of this situation to 




4. Disclosing the causes of the properties of the balance 
 
Stevin's complete reduction to the form of art rested on a preliminary division of the field of 
operations, as shown in the dichotomous table at the very beginning of The Principles of the Art of 
Weighing. It announces that the text will deal with four kinds of basic situations: vertical lowering 
weights, vertical lifting weights, oblique lifting weights and oblique lowering weights. The 
proportions stated by the different propositions will characterize the forces exerted by these 
weights in terms of the weight of the body to be held in equilibrium by them and the geometry of 
the situation, where the main division is between the forces exerted in a vertical direction and those 
exerted in an oblique direction. These propositions are based on the two fundamental propositions 
just analyzed: the law of the lever for vertical forces, and the law of the inclined plane for oblique 
forces, respectively.  
As we have seen, the demonstrations of these two laws were implicitly based on physical 
facts involving bodies' centers of gravity, and more specifically on considering the body composed 
of any two bodies as also having a single center of gravity that remains invariant through the 
replacements (for the law of the lever) or through the counterfactual motion (for the law of the 




staltwicht, though, which has the important advantage that it allows one to focus on the effect that 
each of the bodies has on the other; i.e., it allows one to interpret the mathematically demonstrated 
proportions as characterizing forces. In a further move, Stevin abstracted away from the inclined 
plane as a physical device, until it only represented the triangle of forces implicit in the law of the 
inclined plane that gives a general recipe for determining forces exerted in an oblique direction (see 
fig. 4).23  
Based on his two fundamental propositions, Stevin was in a position to ‘disclose the causes 
of the properties of the balance from their grounds’.24 This disclosure further extends the realm of 
relevant similarities, by exploiting the power of proportional reasoning. Manipulating mathematical 
proportions, it becomes easy to translate the basic cases into other cases with different geometrical 
configurations of forces and weights – but still characterized by equilibrium. Perhaps the most 
relevant instance is given by proposition 20, which shows how to relate vertical lifting weights 
(grounded in the law of the lever) to oblique ones (grounded in the law of the inclined plane): 
 
If there is in the axis of the prism a fixed point and a movable point, at which it is kept in a 
certain position by a vertical lifting weight and an oblique lifting weight: as the vertical lifting 
line is to the oblique lifting line, so is the vertical lifting weight to the oblique lifting weight. 
25 
 
The accompanying diagrams show how to recognize the relevant elements of the proposition in 
different situations, situations that are all essentially similar to the mathematical perspective opened 
up by Stevin's new art of weighing (see fig. 5). Looking at the diagrams, the reader is taught 
immediately how to isolate the crucial ratios that determine equilibrium – thus disclosing the causes. 
Proposition 20 brings a further, related aspect of Stevin's reduction to our attention. In the 
preface to his work, where he extolled the superior qualities of the Dutch language, he had referred 
to the formulation of this proposition as a crucial example. Stevin's defense of Dutch as a scientific 
language was obviously connected both to a broader reassessment of the status of the vernacular 
in the late Renaissance, and to the specific political context of the newly-emerging nation in which 
he wrote his books. But it is important not to lose sight of the fact that his insistence on the 
cognitive reasons for this superiority had an intrinsic connection to his ideal of reduction to art. 
Dutch was the most perfect language, according to Stevin, because of the combined effect of the 
high prevalence of monosyllabic words that correspond to simple things in nature and the 
possibility of combining these words to form new words, the meaning of which is perfectly clear 
from that of their composing parts.26 This made it eminently suitable for teaching the arts, as shown 
by the ease with which complex propositions such as the one presently under consideration could 
be perspicuously expressed. The compositional nature of Dutch allowed the terms to be permuted 
in the right order: ‘Ghelijck rechtheflini tot scheefheflini, alsoo rechthefwicht tot scheefhefwicht’.27 
As in the proofs of the two basic propositions, the printed diagrams and the words of the 
accompanying written text jointly rendered the relevant structures transparent for the reader. 
It is no coincidence that Stevin chose the formulation of a proportion as his crucial 
example. Proportional reasoning was the central engine of his reduction to art, by which one could 
show that a whole field of operations (in this case those involving heavy bodies) could be covered 
by the same principles. Moreover, Stevin had already introduced the term ‘proportion’ itself as a 
general example of the superiority of Dutch in the Bewysconst. The Dutch term evenredenheyt 




abstruse Latin rendering: ‘Proportio est Rationum similitudo’). As a result, the term could be used 
directly to guide correct applications.28 Formulating the goal as a search for relevant evenredenheden 
immediately made it clear that one was looking for ratios that remain invariant throughout different 
configurations. Significantly, Stevin often used reden (which primarily means ‘reason’ or ‘ratio’) as 
almost directly synonymous with oirsaeck or cause (as is possible in many languages).29 An 
evenredenheyt could thus be understood as simultaneously expressing a mathematical relationship and 
a causal equivalence.  
 
 
5. Formal causality and the arts 
 
Stevin's way of using of causal language to describe his mathematical art of weighing was perfectly 
consistent with his denial of real definitions expressing underlying essences in the Bewysconst. 
Indeed, in that same work he also approached causal structures from the perspective of human 
agency rather than that of essential powers inhering in natural things.30  
Stevin opened the Bewysconst with definitions of the four traditional causes: material, formal, 
efficient and final; but he used them exclusively to refer to artificial constructions where the causes 
jointly result in an effect that he called the werck or daet. Stevin silently transformed the fourfold 
distinction from an ontological description of the structure of all natural events into a pragmatic 
scheme that could be used to characterize everything that is done by art.31 To give an example, 
similar to Stevin's own of the beer barrel: a mechanical practitioner (efficient, or ‘making’ cause) 
constructing a balance (effect or daet) by imposing a certain geometrical configuration (formal 
cause) on some pieces of iron (material cause) to be able to weigh bodies accurately (final cause). 
According to this scheme, the theoretical art of weighing is completely devoted to 
investigating the formal cause.32 Again, the explicit definition that Stevin gave of a formal cause 
superficially appears as though it focuses on purely verbal questions: ‘Form is the cause out of 
which the matter receives the name of some species’.33 In this case, the resulting material object 
will be called a balance, because the geometrical structure imposed upon the matter makes it 
suitable for performing a specific kind of operation, i.e., weighing. It is the latter suitability that is 
guaranteed by the theoretical analysis of ‘the causes of the properties of the balance’. All ‘formally’ 
possible configurations of the balance are determined by the realm of relevant similarities 
underlying the propositions proven in the art of weighing that allow these configurations to play 
their causal role. Or to put it differently: these similarities provide appropriate causal grounding 
because they determine the extension of the species ‘configurations in equilibrium’ to which all 
balances belong. This does imply that the causal status of claims ultimately depends on our 
classificatory interests. Discovering causal factors comes down to identifying the structural features 
of systems that allow them to be classified in specific ways.  
Stevin's causal scheme from the Bewysconst also gives us more insight into Weeghconst and 
Weeghdaet. Whereas the theoretical book on the art of weighing was limited to an abstract study of 
the formal cause, the other book, which was published simultaneously (its title can be translated as 
the ‘The Practice of Weighing’, following Stevin's own Latin annotation), dealt with the effects that 
could be achieved when the formal configurations uncovered by the theoretical investigation were 






6. Coordinating theory and practice, cause and effect 
 
Stevin's book on the Weeghdaet was devoted to teaching its readers to recognize the theoretically 
established proportions in material constructions. It shows how our basic ways of dealing with 
heavy objects in practice exemplify certain configurations of forces, helping us to achieve our goals. 
By translating practical challenges in terms of the staltwicht of objects involved, it becomes possible 
to make efficient decisions regarding the proper actions to be taken or instruments to be used in 
diverse circumstances (see, e.g., fig. 6). By reducing mechanical knowledge to the form of art, Stevin 
thus rationalized the structure of our practical actions in a way that also allows us to extend our 
initial know-how to ever-new situations that can be brought under our control. In several places, 
Stevin commented that he only gave a few examples, and that these should suffice to clarify how 
to affect the coordination between theory and practice. After this, one should be able to translate 
other situations at will by drawing the appropriate diagrams.34 
As a reduction to art, Stevin's theoretical treatment started with a practical field that was 
already partly articulated by know-how. For example, he commented on how people had noticed 
the effect of a longer lever arm in practice, before gaining any theoretical insight into the underlying 
mathematical proportions.35 This prior experience of heavy bodies helped delineate the field by 
drawing attention to crucial aspects that should be incorporated into the theoretical treatment. This 
is why it was so crucial to Stevin to appeal to very simple, qualitative experiences that could help 
ground his theory. After having stated propositions 6, 7 and 8 in the Weeghconst (the crucial 
importance of which was already stressed above, since they describe the different kinds of 
equilibrium that result from the relative position of a body's center of gravity with respect to its 
fixed point), Stevin added that ‘If anyone should wish to see the contents of the preceding three 
propositions by some experience, he might take a ruler of wood’. By making some holes in the 
ruler and making it freely pivot around a needle that had been put through these holes, one would 
immediately see the qualitative truth of these propositions for this simple object.36 
Thus, it is no coincidence that the first proposition of the Weeghdaet explained in detail how 
to practically (werckelick) find any body's center of gravity through a combination of simple 
operations of suspension. Given that it is the most important notion in the theoretical elaboration, 
it was crucial that everybody could acknowledge its practical existence. It is revealing to compare 
this first proposition to the first proposition of Stevin's text on practical geometry, the Meetdaet, 
which explained how to construct a straight line using a number of different methods.37 We can 
see this proposition as providing instructions on how materially to perform the crucial elementary 
operation that was already given, purely theoretically, by Euclid's first postulate. This shows that 
more complicated, theoretically-established propositions can ‘in principle’ also be applied to 
empirical situations, since their validity depends on this postulated possibility. Exactly the same 
role is played by the first proposition of the Weeghdaet. If you can constructively determine any 
given body's center of gravity, you can ‘in principle’ construct all configurations of material bodies 
in equilibrium. As in the case of geometry, reducing a practice to the form of art involved the 
identification of elementary operations that allowed one to ground the coordination of the practice 
with an elaborated theoretical structure. 
Note how Stevin defined theory in the later text on the ‘restoration of the Age of the Sages’: 
‘Theory [Spiegheling] is an imaginary operation [verdochten handel] without natural matter’.38 He had 
likewise opened The Principles of the Art of Weighing with the characterization of its subject matter as 




center of gravity as ‘the point such that if the body is conceived to be suspended [door ons ghedacht 
hanghende] from it, it remains at rest in any position given to it’. He commented on the latter 
definition by stressing its imaginary character: it is a suspension that is only effected in one’s mind.40 
Following Stevin's use of the Dutch term spiegheling (speculation or reflection) for theory, we can 
understand these imaginary operations as ideally ‘mirroring’ the structure of practical activities: 
theoretical structures are in the first place linked to possibilities for acting – and we can see the 
stylized hands suspending the geometrical bodies in Stevin's theoretical treatise (see the figures 
above) as striking visual reminders of this crucial link. It is only through this speculative reduction 
to art that the structure of our practical activities can for the first time be fully and transparently 
articulated. 
The second proposition of the Weeghdaet played a similar role to the first one, but it also 
brought a further kind of consideration into play. This proposition described how to construct ‘a 
most perfect balance’, one that would remain at rest in any position it was given, thus directly 
exhibiting the defining property of a body's center of gravity for bodies of more complex shape 
than the simple wooden ruler already alluded to in the Weeghconst. But this object also had its own 
practical use as a measurement instrument for establishing precise quantitative relationships. The 
conditions for such precise measurements were further analyzed in propositions 2-6. In the last of 
these propositions, Stevin described a small device that he called an oblique balance, with which 
‘to make us see, examine, and understand through visual experience the truth of the propositions 
on the proportionality of oblique weights’. He thus introduced an instrument for the measurement 
of oblique forces that could play the same role as the ‘most perfect balance’ did for the vertical 
forces.41 
These propositions were absolutely crucial to establish in full the coordination between 
theory and practice. The conditions required for high precision instruments were theoretically 
established, but could never be perfectly verified in practice due to the limitations of working with 
material objects. Stevin explicitly allowed that practitioners had to decide how closely they needed 
to approximate these conditions for the purpose at hand;42 but his detailed description, with an eye 
to the empirical challenges encountered, clearly revealed that he supposed that these 
approximations could in principle always be improved upon. In his later reflection on reduction to 
art in the text on the ‘restoration of the Age of the Sages’, he formulated the relationship between 
theory and practice as follows: ‘The property and the end of theory is that it furnishes a sure 
foundation for the method of practical operation, in which by closer and more painstaking care 
one may get as near to the perfection of the theory as the purpose of the matter requires for the 
benefit of man’.43 The possibility of this ever-closer approximation was thus an essential part of 
the successful reduction to art, as it guaranteed the relevance of the theoretically proven, 
mathematically exact proportions. 
After the first six propositions, Stevin considered situations for which such approximation 
could nevertheless not be expected. In the preface, he had already warned his reader not to mistake 
this for a defect of the theory.44 When machines are put into motion to realize useful effects, this 
inevitably brings material impediments to this motion that cannot be eliminated in any way.45 But 
given the successful establishment of the first six propositions, this should no longer worry us 
unduly. We are now in a position legitimately to ascribe the differences between theoretically 





The theoretical proportions remain relevant for the latter kind of situations, since we can 
trust them to articulate correctly the structure of the situation we are analyzing. Consider, for 
instance, the situation in fig. 7: if the force applied by the man is to the weight of the load H as KG 
is to EG (the radius of the axle around which the rope pulling the load is being coiled), this will in 
theory keep the load in equilibrium. Again, in theory, the smallest additional force would suffice to 
start raising the load – but in practice this will of course not be the case, because of the material 
impediments that need to be overcome. We do not know in advance how much more force we 
will actually have to exert to move the load, but we do know that the force determined by the 
theory is the minimum force: it puts a theoretical limit on the operation of the machine. The same 
theoretical consideration also tells us how to identify the relevant causal factors that might be taken 
into consideration if we want to adapt the machine to new circumstances (e.g., if we wanted to 
move a heavier load or if less force were available). 
The last proposition of the Weeghdaet provides the most spectacular example of this way of 
structurally linking theory to practical challenges. It introduced a machine that Stevin daringly called 
het Almachtich (‘the Almighty’).46 This machine was proposed to actualize the theoretical possibility 
of producing a multiplication of power that could in principle be indefinitely extended, such that 
any conceivable practical challenge could be met. The machine basically consists of a system of 
geared cogwheels that multiply an initial force delivered with a crank and transmit the output force 
using a windlass. Stevin stressed the practical advantages of his design over alternatives, due to the 
sturdiness of its construction, the continuous nature of its output motion, and the ease with which 
parts of the system could be disengaged, depending on the amount of multiplication that was 
needed for the task at hand.47 Yet it is not simply a practical machine, as is made clear by its 
provocative name. Having illustrated its use to haul a ship over a dam, Stevin went through 
elaborate calculations to show the effects of adding more and more gears to the system, until he 
finally concluded that this would allow a mere child to move the earth, thus making true on 
Archimedes' famous boast. But, he added, continually operating the machine over a period of ten 
years would have only lifted the earth a distance of 1/2,400,000,000,000,000 feet. 
The clearly fantastic nature of this last example raises a question about its place in Stevin's 
Weeghdaet. The general focus of the treatise is on the challenges posed by concrete materiality, but 
it is obvious that this postulated motion would never take place, due to all the imperfections that 
would arise in the transmission of the motion and the stresses that would be put on the whole 
device. The discussion seems to have been included with a dual purpose.48 On the one hand, the 
play with immense numbers (all printed in full, some with more than thirty digits) was no doubt 
intended to dazzle the reader. On the other hand, and more importantly, the comments on the 
time spent and distance moved that accompanied these numbers simultaneously pointed in another 
direction: they warned the reader that multiplication of force must always be balanced against other 
factors. And this last point does have important practical implications. It is no coincidence that 
having gone through these spectacular extrapolations, Stevin ended his book by returning to some 
of the Almighty's practicable applications, by giving some examples of tasks for which it would be 
suitable – but added, tellingly, that he would not enter into any further discussion of these, since 
the reader who had followed his discussion would know best how to adapt the machine ‘according 
to the occasion’.49 This adaptation to particular occasions crucially includes considerations 
involving the balance between multiplication of available force, distance moved and time spent: 




choices have to be made, but it does not dictate which one is right. At this point, the practical 
intelligence of the practitioner necessarily takes over. 
This last point highlights the importance of ‘the occasion’ for correctly understanding the 
relationship between theory and practice.50 It is never a matter of simply ‘applying’ theory, but 
rather one of guiding the process of situationally determined, practical decision-making by 
mathematically explicating the structure of a range of possible actions and their effects.  
All the foregoing should also allow us to better gauge the place of mathematical reasoning 
in Stevin's proposed reduction to art. We start from a set of qualitative observations that draw our 
attention to a number of significant phenomena. Theoretical speculation shows that these 
qualitative observations in principle allow the establishment of precise quantitative relationships. 
These relationships can indeed be exemplified to a very good approximation in well-determined 
material circumstances. Mathematical reasoning furthermore allows the identification of a much 
larger class of situations that are – in principle – also similar to these cases. Even if precise 
quantitative relations can no longer be empirically exhibited for this larger class, mathematics has 
still played a crucial role. It has allowed the identification of a causal structure underlying the messy 
empirical situations that puts theoretically-determined constraints on what we can and cannot put 
into effect.  
There is one last aspect that needs to be commented upon. We saw how the existence of a 
unique center of gravity was absolutely crucial for the theoretical articulation of the causal 
structures in question. Stevin was well aware that this could only be assumed under specific 
circumstances.51 If we were to take into consideration that all material bodies' ‘power of descent’ is 
actually directed towards the center of the world, then we would have to conclude that only 
perfectly spherical bodies have a unique center of gravity; for all other bodies, there would be no 
longer a ‘point such that if the body is conceived to be suspended from it, it remains at rest in any 
position given to it’ (see fig. 8, where the balance would need to be supported at a different point 
to be kept in equilibrium when no longer oriented horizontally). We can safely ignore this 
complication, though: the scale of our instruments is so insignificant with respect to the size of the 
earth that any convergence of directions must remain imperceptible. But this does imply that the 
causal structures uncovered by Stevin's art of weighing must again be relativized to a specific 
domain of reality that is singled out by the demands of our practical and classificatory goals. If we 
were to consider bodies on a different scale, it would no longer be possible to establish the relevant 
configurations described in the treatise as similar. 
 
 
7. Conclusion: ‘this long-hidden matter’ 
 
Stevin was rightly proud of having successfully reduced practical dealings with mechanical 
instruments to the form of an art. Archimedes' highly abstract mathematical treatise on the 
equilibrium of plane figures had been well known since its publication in 1544, and some important 
contributions to the medieval scientia de ponderibus had also been published by Tartaglia and had 
found their way into Cardano's popular writings, for example. Sixteenth-century Europe was also 
characterized by a rich material culture where skillful production and use of diverse mechanical 
contrivances played a central role. What was lacking was a way of clearly linking the theoretical 




As I hope to have shown, this articulation of mathematically-structured theory on material 
practice also determined Stevin's perspective on how to uncover causal factors in the world. The 
main goal of his reduction to art was to show how a whole array of seemingly diverse operations 
could be seen as characterized by an underlying systematic unity – and this unity could also be seen 
as expressing a causal structure. In this way, the ideal of reduction to art implicitly introduced a 
strikingly un-Aristotelian epistemology of causal knowledge, in which causes could be identified 
through a combination of mathematical reasoning that isolates invariant ratios, and material 
construction that shows how to exemplify these mathematical structures.  
Most of the themes we have been discussing came together in the opening paragraph of 
Stevin's dedication of his Principles of the Art of Weighing to Emperor Rudolph II: 
 
That number, magnitude, and weight are in all existing things inseparable attributes, full of 
profound and useful properties, is attested not only by several scholars, but it is also known 
to all by experience in all things. It is also known that the first two, to the great profit of man, 
have reached the form of written arts, viz. arithmetic and geometry; but not so weight, 
because its fundamental properties have remained hidden from our predecessors. It is true 
that with regard to vertical weights it has been observed by experience that two evenstaltwichtigh 
gravities are proportional to their arms. But they thought that this proportionality was due 
to the circles described about the fixed point by the extremities of the arms. From which, as 
is usual with errors, there followed no knowledge of the causes. As to the oblique weights, 
these were not known at all, with the result that this subject matter could not receive the 
form of an art like the others. But when the situation changed, and this long-hidden matter 
was revealed through its fundamental principles, it at last reached this status, in the formal 
shape in which it is here being dedicated to Your Imperial Majesty. 53 
 
Stevin's recurring focus on the proper formal features of the ‘written’ presentation of any art 
parallels the role of formal causality as the Weeghonst's main subject matter, as explained in Section 
5. In both cases, the central issue is how to dispose given matter in a structure that allows one to 
achieve certain effects. The discussion on the ‘restoration of the Age of the Sages’, summarized in 
Section 1 above, can thus be seen as intended as a description of the formal cause of all theoretical 
arts. 
This resolutely structural perspective is in line with Stevin's translation of theoria as spiegheling 
(reflection or speculation), as noted above in Section 6. As Stevin (who also wrote a treatise on 
perspective and captoptrics) was perfectly well aware, one can never reflect the whole situation in 
which one finds oneself: by orienting one's mirror, one delineates that part of the situation which 
is of prime interest; as we saw in Section 2, this was the role of Stevin's theoretical definitions. The 
translation into the reflected form is then brought about by the propagation of light. The reflection 
shows a projection of the spatial relationships on a two-dimensional surface, where the 
relationships are presented purely in the light, abstracted from their original material relata. It is the 
light that writes the ‘theoretical’ or ‘speculative’ proportional relations, leaving formal traces that 
can be translated into action by the person who has learned to use the mirror.54 Abstracting away 
from matter to ‘reveal’ the formal relations that can be exploited in further practice is exactly what 
mathematics did for Stevin, as we saw in sections 3 and 4: it ‘brought to light’ what had remained 

























Figure 4: According to the law of the inclined plane, there is equilibrium if the weight M of the 
body is to the weight of E as AB is to BC, which is in the same ratio as LD to DI. This implies that 
the physical plane can be neglected in further considerations, as is done in the figure on the right, 






















Figure 8: Non-uniqueness of center of gravity for weights along converging directions. 
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